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Is it still possible to speak of immediate, unreflective 
experiences after the rejection of the myth of the given, 
after the pragmatic and semiotic criticism of the concept 
of non-mediated datum, and after the linguistic turn and 
the hermeneutic developments of phenomenology in the 
twentieth century? 
Can we honestly and non-dogmatically recognize 
those aspects of our more or less ordinary experiences 
where all references come to an end, we plainly 
understand what is happening or, maybe, it is not a 
cognitive question at all?  
Might it not be the case that a qualitative, pre-
scientific or a-scientific dimension is already present 
here, a dimension that cannot be translated into 
quantitative terms and which has to do with the 
significance of experience at multiple levels – from bodily 
perception to aesthetic and ethic sensibility? Can we 
reasonably state that some sort of “imponderable 
evidence” – to quote Anna Boncompagni’s essay – gives 
us access to the immediate background of our actions 
and thinking, which is already there prior to any 
cognitive enterprise or epistemic project? 
Classical pragmatism – particularly Peirce’s one, 
primarily considered in its semiotic aspect, as well as 
Dewey’s pragmatism, according to which “givens” are 
“takens” when dealing with the logic of inquiry – has 
correctly been described as the first source of criticism of 
the so-called “myth of the given”. On the other hand, it is 
well known to Wittgenstein’s readers that he understood 
                                                 
1
 Although this introduction has been a joint effort, 
Roberta Dreon wrote the first section of the preface 
while Anna Boncompagni wrote the second part of the 
text. 
philosophy as an eminently grammatical approach to 
language and that he consequently criticized any appeal 
to the allegedly experienced character of meaning, 
conceived as something primarily subjective. 
Nonetheless, it is equally known that James and 
Dewey tirelessly emphasized the qualitative, 
aesthetic and unreflective aspects of our experiences, 
which are significant for what they do directly on us, 
without being further deferred to other things (see 
Roberta Dreon’s paper). Wittgenstein all too frequently 
evokes those situations in which there is no need to 
speak and think any further, situations in which we are 
simply "to look at" what is happening as something 
“complete” in itself, dissolving its apparently problematic 
character – as Luigi Perissinotto explains in his essay. 
The point is that the appeal to immediacy is far from 
unambiguous and can serve very different goals, as 
Vincent Colapietro highlights in his paper: the range of 
possibilities extends from the typically modern 
philosophical aim of establishing a secure foundation for 
our knowledge to the post-metaphysical 
acknowledgment that our experience of the world, 
including its bodily anchorage (to which Ángel Faerna 
directs our attention), is prior to the formulation of any 
radical doubt.  
The articles collected in this issue of the journal 
share a basic downplaying of any epistemological claim 
for immediacy in favour of a more existential or 
anthropological understanding of the concept. They 
explore this subject by engaging with a variety of aspects 
and touching upon different nuances of the term: from 
the overlap between the concepts of immediate and 
direct experience to the distinction between the 
epistemological and existential interpretation of 
certainty; from the opposition between qualitative and 
quantitative experience to their intertwinement and 
mutual shaping; from an understanding of immediately 
experienced meanings in terms of gestures (as pointed 
out by Barbara Formis) to language-acquired habits 
which have "become nature to us" (as highlighted by 
Marilena Andronico); from the immediacy of 
competency, ability and the likes to the immediacy of 
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novelty (as noted by Giovanni Tuzet). This issue of 
Pragmatism Today represents the third step in the 
ongoing research on Wittgenstein and the Pragmatists 
conducted by a group of scholars mainly based in Italy 
and originally brought together by Rosa Maria Calcaterra 
(University of Roma Tre) and Luigi Perissinotto 
(University of Venice Ca’ Foscari) in 2015. The previous 
stages of the research focused on habits, norms, and 
forms of life and on psychologism. The papers resulting 
from them were respectively published in Paradigmi 
(issue XXXIV (3), 2016) and the European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy (issue IX (1), 
2017). Most of the papers published in this issue of 
Pragmatism Today were presented at a conference held 
at the University of Florence in September 2017, which 
also saw the participation of members of the research 
unit “Qualitative Ontology and Technology (Qua-Onto-
Tech)”, coordinated by Roberta Lanfredini, thus leading 
the research to address phenomenological topics. 
Additionally, we welcome and strongly appreciate the 
collaboration of Vincent Colapietro, Ángel Manuel 
Faerna, and Barbara Formis, who have joined us in the 
present phase of the project. We are also very grateful to 
Pragmatism Today and, more specifically, to Alexander 
Kremer for hosting this part of our collaborative inquiry 
and for giving us the chance to make it accessible to a 
wider audience. 
The three papers that open this issue retrace some 
central topics in the traditions that we are examining. 
Michela Bella offers an analysis of James’ conception of 
experience as a way to approach the difference between 
percepts and concepts, that is between the immediate 
and the mediated. James’ radical empiricism, she points 
out, can be usefully interpreted as ‘a theory of 
experience based on a theory of relations’, so that the 
thesis of relations being themselves experienced comes 
to play a key role. It is in the dialectic between the 
knower and the known, interpreted as a relation 
between parts of experience, that the difference 
between percepts and concepts emerges. Such a view 
also helps to better contextualize Wittgenstein’s criticism 
of James, centred on the latter’s use of introspection in 
his treatment of concepts. Alice Morelli’s contribution is 
focused on James and Wittgenstein, and more 
specifically on what she calls “the experiential account of 
meaning” that Wittgenstein attributes to James. After 
describing James’ approach as it emerges in the 
Principles of Psychology, she introduces Wittgenstein’s 
reservations about it, and clarifies that Wittgenstein’s 
aim is not to deny that there are experiential elements in 
meaning, but rather to oppose the tendency to ground 
meaning in experience. In her conclusion, Morelli also 
points in the direction of a Wittgenstein-inspired but at 
the same time broadly pragmatist notion of meaning as 
socially embedded and enacted, thus showing the 
contemporary relevance of these reflections. Andrea 
Pace Giannotta instead investigates the concept of 
experience by drawing a comparison between James’ 
radical empiricism and Edmund Husserl’s genetic 
phenomenology. This allows him to go beyond the 
apparent contrast between James’ later thought, 
characterized by a strong anti-dualism, and Husserl’s 
approach, focused instead on the dual dimension of 
intentionality. Giannotta points out that even in 
Husserl’s genetic phenomenology the flow of primal 
impressions is conceived of as a fundamental dimension 
of experience that precedes the duality between subject 
and object. In his view, this conception, by anchoring 
experience in the embodied subject, can also 
complement the Jamesian perspective in the direction of 
concreteness, against certain metaphysical 
interpretations.  
The five contributions that follow tackle more 
directly the theoretical core and the methodological 
aspects of the theme under discussion. The focus of 
Vincent Colapietro’s paper is on immediate experience 
as opposed to the artificial skeptical doubt that calls the 
very existence of the world into question. Both the 
classical pragmatists and Wittgenstein, he observes, 
oppose the usual move of traditional philosophy, which 
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detaches itself from ordinary life, as this were the only 
means for “true” philosophizing and for true critique. 
This opposition results in an appeal to the immediacy of 
the relationship between human beings and the world, 
that is, the immediacy of human beings’ inhabiting the 
world not as knowers, but as agents in an arena of 
action, where “action” is to be understood in a broad 
sense that encompasses both experience and language. 
In a similar spirit, Roberta Dreon articulates a 
deflationary pragmatist perspective on immediate 
experience by focusing mainly on Dewey, who in her 
view developed a novel approach to this issue as a result 
of his way of dissolving a tension between the young 
Peirce’s take on the mediated nature of human cognition 
and the later James’ views on immediate experience. 
Dewey’s solution hinges on a rich conception of 
experience as something strictly connected with human 
life, in such a way that language and cognition 
themselves are understood as parts of experience, and 
hence not in opposition to it. The later Wittgenstein 
interestingly turns out to be broadly in agreement with 
such a view. This is confirmed, from a methodological 
point of view, by Luigi Perissinotto, who draws attention 
to Wittgenstein’s use of the word “problematic” and 
observes that the aim of philosophy for him is precisely 
the disappearance of what is problematic in life. One 
form that this disappearance can take, Perissinotto 
argues, has to do with the capacity to acknowledge that 
what immediately appears incomplete is not something 
waiting to be completed (typically, by a sort of theory). In 
this sense, Wittgenstein’s philosophical method, centred 
on renouncing theory, is an appeal to immediacy: it is an 
appeal to see things as they are, by resisting the 
temptation to fill-in the gaps via theoretical moves. Fully 
in accordance with this claim, Marilena Andronico takes 
as her starting point Wittgenstein’s insistence on the fact 
that forms of life are a “given” that has to be accepted, a 
“given” which, in her interpretation, crucially includes 
linguistic habits and the following of rules. These broadly 
cultural and acquired habits, she observes, have an 
intrinsically normative aspect, but nevertheless remain 
immediate. Their being part of the immediate given 
means that they play the role of irreducible elements 
within a certain kind of grammatical inquiry, defining its 
very domain. In this way, Andronico suggests, a 
grammatical investigation remains compatible with a 
form of naturalism, yet differs from an approach (like 
James’, in Wittgenstein’s perception) that relies solely on 
experience. Another paper primarily dealing with 
Wittgenstein is Anna Boncompagni’s one, whose focus is 
on the apparently elusive notion of ‘imponderable 
evidence’ that Wittgenstein uses to describe our 
understanding of others’ feelings and emotions, as well 
as our aesthetic judgments. In these contexts, she 
observes, we are often guided by a form of immediate 
and qualitative evidence that remains unmeasurable, 
ungraspable, and almost impossible to put into words. In 
imponderable evidence, Boncompagni argues, 
immediacy and experience are interwoven: in order to 
clarify this point, she turns to Dewey’s conception of 
‘qualitative thought’, which shows surprising affinities 
with the Wittgensteinian perspective. Both thinkers, she 
concludes, help highlight the importance for philosophy 
of a fuller consideration of the qualitative dimension of 
human existence. 
The three papers that conclude our issue deal with 
more specific traits of immediate experience, which 
prove to be particularly salient. Ángel Faerna is 
interested in highlighting the epistemological 
significance of the body. In contrast with the traditional 
neglect of the body, he notes that according to the later 
Wittgenstein (as also underlined by neuropsychiatrist 
Oliver Sacks) we normally have a non-discursive, 
immediate awareness of our having a body. Moreover, 
as the pragmatists also help us realize, this somatic 
awareness if crucially practical, as it has to do with the 
potentialities of the active body within the situation in 
which it is embedded. In spite of some short-sighted 
interpretations of bodily awareness, which all too hastily 
conflate it with either the privateness of mental states or 
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the foundationalism of the “myth of the given”, Faerna 
urges us to fully acknowledge its role in knowledge. 
Barbara Formis’ contribution is close to this perspective 
in her emphasizing the importance of gestures and 
asking what the relationship between gestures and 
meaning is. Making use of John Dewey’s criticism of 
Darwinism, she highlights that a merely naturalistic 
approach risks overlooking that there is something more 
to a gesture than a simple organic discharge; yet, Formis 
also denies that gestures can be transformed into a 
formalized and logical form. By drawing from the later 
Wittgenstein, she finds a middle path between these two 
extremes, one that fully acknowledges the 
intertwinement between the biological and the social, 
and ultimately explains gestures as performed acts that 
carry an immediate quality and are characterized by an 
“overflow”, or a sort of “possibility of meaning”. Finally, 
Giovanni Tuzet distinguishes between two concepts of 
experience, the “singular” (“having an experience”) and 
the “general” (“having experience” or “being 
experienced”). After illustrating some insights of the 
classical pragmatists in the light of this distinction, he 
examines how some philosophers who are somewhat 
close to the pragmatists – Wittgenstein, Quine, and 
McDowell – dealt with experience, noting that they 
tended to privilege either one or the other aspect. 
Finally, he applies his distinction to the field of the 
philosophy of law, and reinterprets the dialectic between 
“stories” and “background generalizations” in the 
scholarship on the topic of evidence as a dialectic 
between the singular and the general concepts of 
experience, showing how this contributes to a better 
understanding of such problems. 
